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Abstract 
 
The choice of a research path in attacking scientific and technological problems is a significant 
component of firms’ R&D strategy. One of the findings of the patent races literature is that, in a 
competitive market setting, firms’ noncooperative choices of research projects display an excessive 
degree of correlation, as compared to the socially optimal level. The paper revisits this question in a 
context in which firms have access to trade secrets, in addition to patents, to assert intellectual property 
rights (IPR) over their discoveries. We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection instruments 
can move the paths chosen by firms engaged in an R&D race toward the social optimum. 
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1. Introduction 
By endowing inventors with exclusive property rights over their discoveries, patents can be a 
powerful incentive for undertaking new research and development (R&D) projects in a market economy, 
thereby promoting the flow of innovation that is at the root of modern economic growth. Ancillary 
benefits that are often cited include the patent system’s role in disseminating new knowledge and in 
helping technology transfer and commercialization of new inventions. But patents are a quintessential 
second-best solution to very real market failures that affect the provision of innovations in a competitive 
setting. Whereas they solve some incentive problems, the monopoly positions engineered by patent rights 
can create other inefficiencies (see Scotchmer, 2004, or Langinier and Moschini, 2002, for an overview). 
The economic issues raised by patent races are a case in point. The competition for the economic rents 
secured by a patent provides incentive for parallel research (Dasgupta, 1990). Given that R&D projects 
have uncertain outcomes, some parallel research may be desirable from the social point of view because it 
increases the probability of success. But because the reward to firms engaged in a patent race is in the 
form of winner takes all, too much parallel research is also possible in a competitive setting, an example 
of the rent dissipation postulate (Tirole, 1988). 
In addition to providing a possibly inefficient amount of R&D investment, parallel research also 
may fail to provide the correct type of R&D efforts. Specifically, competitors in a patent race may choose 
strategies that are too risky from society’s viewpoint (Klette and de Meza, 1986). More subtly, R&D 
competitors may choose projects that are excessively correlated relative to what is socially desirable. 
Expanding on earlier work by Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) 
showed that projects selected by firms engaged in a patent race are in fact excessively correlated. Cabral 
(1994) showed that the excess risk result is sensitive to the specification of the winner-takes-all 
assumption, and a model allowing for post-R&D oligopoly market sharing may actually induce the 
opposite bias (too little risk-taking in R&D). However, excess correlation of R&D still obtains in his 
model. Cabral (2002) studied the strategic choice of covariance in a dynamic R&D model and showed 
that, in equilibrium, laggards may want to diversify from leaders, thereby choosing less-promising paths. 
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In this paper we revisit the issue of excessive correlation in a parallel research setting by 
investigating the impact of a more realistic institutional setting. Specifically, it is known that firms rely on 
multiple modes of protection for their discoveries. Trade secrets, lead time, and manufacturing 
capabilities not only complement patents in helping firms appropriate returns from R&D activities but are 
often considered more important (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Indeed, the reported importance of 
trade secrecy increased dramatically compared with earlier industry surveys (Arundel, 2001). Trade 
secrets are particularly attractive to inventors when a discovery is difficult and costly to reverse-engineer 
and/or discover independently (Daizadeh et al., 2002). In agricultural innovations, for example, this has 
been the case for proprietary germplasm. Pioneer Hi-Bred International successfully used trade secrets to 
protect its germplasm in at least two high-profile cases (against Holden Foundation Seeds, Inc. in 1991, 
for a judgment worth $46.7 million, and against Cargill, Inc. in 2000, for a settlement worth $100 
million). More generally, Lerner (1995) finds that trade secret disputes captured 43% of intellectual 
property litigations. 
The impact of alternative modes of intellectual property protection has been the object of a 
number of studies. In line with the strategic patenting hypothesis discussed in the empirical literature, 
Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski (1985) consider the relative advantage of the explicit choice not to 
patent. In a signaling model, Scotchmer and Green (1990) consider not patenting as an alternative to 
patenting intermediate discoveries in a multistage innovation race. Anton and Yao (2004) study the 
choice between patenting and trade secrets to process innovation in a Cournot competition setting. 
Denicolò and Franzoni (2004) explicitly model multiple modes of protection available to innovators in 
studying the ability of patents to exclude prior users. Note that these studies have focused on the choice of 
research intensity. However, the choice of research path in attacking scientific and technological 
problems is a significant component of firms’ R&D strategy (Cabral, 2003). 
Does the availability of alternative modes of protection affect the research path chosen by R&D 
competitors? That is essentially the question that we propose to analyze in this paper, and we do so by 
developing a simple model that combines features of the analyses of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) and 
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Denicolò and Franzoni (2004). In particular, we model the strategic interaction between firms both at the 
stage of project selection and at the stage of intellectual property (IP) choice.1 By linking research and IP 
game stages, we are able to analyze how the availability of intellectual property right (IPR) protection 
instruments affects some relevant research choices in a parallel R&D contest. We find that the availability 
of additional modes of protection (trade secrets in our model) may in fact lead R&D competitors to 
choose less-correlated projects. The root of our finding is that the presence of an additional IPR 
instrument introduces an asymmetry on how firms are rewarded in the event of success. Specifically, 
when there is a single winner in the R&D contest, the availability of trade secrets (in addition to patents) 
means that the firm has the option of selecting a possibly more profitable IPR protection. But when both 
firms are successful, the strategic game between firms makes the additional IPR protection instruments 
less useful. Thus, the presence of trade secrets in addition to patents provides an additional incentive to be 
the sole winner, thereby driving firms’ R&D choices closer to the social optimum for a range of 
parameter values. We conclude that modeling parallel research with just one winner-takes-all instrument 
(i.e., patents) may exaggerate the concerns about the insufficient diversification of privately chosen 
research portfolios. Our model is also useful in recovering a role for patent length as a policy tool in this 
context, shedding perhaps a novel light on the interaction among alternative IPR protection modes. 
 
2. The Modeling Framework 
The starting point of our model is the two-point distribution approach introduced in Dasgupta and 
Maskin (1987). The R&D contest is represented as a one-shot game in which two firms (firm 1 and firm 
2) simultaneously pursue a research project, the outcome of which is either “success” (denoted with S ) or 
                                               
1
 The competition in the research stage is often suppressed in the literature studying strategic patenting, 
whereby it is usually assumed that one of the firms is the winner of the research contest, and a leader-
follower situation arises at the patenting stage (e.g., Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski, 1985; 
Denicolò and Franzoni, 2004; and Bessen, 2004). On the other hand, studies focusing on the research 
stage competition typically do not model the strategic interaction in the choices concerning IP protection 
(e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). 
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“failure” (denoted with F ). Let  { , }iX S F∈   denote the random outcome for the  thi   firm ( 1,2i = ), such 
that four events  1 2( , )X X   are possible:  ( , )S S , ( , )S F , ( , )F S , and ( , ).F F  If  ip   denotes the  thi  
firm’s unconditional probability of success, and  ρ   represents the coefficient of correlation of the 
dichotomous variables iX  (e.g., Hays and Winkler, 1970, pp. 206-208), the probabilities of the four 
possible events are as follows: 
( ) 1 2 1 1 2 2, (1 ) (1 )prob S S p p p p p pρ= + − −       (1.a) 
( ) 1 2 1 1 2 2, (1 ) (1 ) (1 )prob S F p p p p p pρ= − − − −      (1.b) 
( ) 1 2 1 1 2 2, (1 ) (1 ) (1 )prob F S p p p p p pρ= − − − −      (1.c) 
( ) 1 2 1 1 2 2, (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )prob F F p p p p p pρ= − − + − −      (1.d) 
where  1 1 2 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) ( , )p p p p Cov X Xρ − − =   is the covariance term. 
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), in this setting the presumption is that a firm can unilaterally 
diversify from its rival (thereby reducing the correlation of outcomes) at the expense of decreasing its 
own unconditional probability of success. Thus, we assume that each firm can choose an action  [0,1]ia ∈   
that affects both the unconditional probability of success  ip   as well as the correlation/covariance of 
outcomes, where  0ia =   represents no diversification effort of firm i  and 1ia =  represents firm i ’s  
maximum diversification.2 Specifically, we write ( )i ip p a= , 1,2i = , and 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ).Cov X X C a a= 3  In 
the analysis that follows we rely on the following. 
 
                                               
2
 Note that our specification differs slightly from that adopted by Dasgupta and Maskin (1987). In 
particular, they consider the project space to be [ ]1 2 ,1  for firm 1 and [ ]0 ,1 2  for firm 2. Also, their 
parameterization of the covariance structure differs from the canonical form given previously. 
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 Because the success probability function ( )p ⋅  is the same for both firms, the covariance function is 
symmetric in project choices, that is, 1 2 2 1( , ) ( ,  )C a a C a a= , ( )1 2, [0,1] [0,1]a a∀ ∈ × .  
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Assumption 1. (i) The unconditional probability function  ( )ip a   is strictly decreasing and strictly 
concave in its domain, with maximum at  0ia =   and minimum at  1ia = . (ii) The covariance function  
1 2( , )C a a   is strictly decreasing in ia  ( 1,2)i = . (iii) The probability of event  ( , ),F F   that is  
[ ][ ]1 2 1 21 ( ) 1 ( ) ( , ),p a p a C a a− − +   is strictly convex in ia  ( 1,2)i = . 
 
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), moreover, it may also be desirable to restrict attention to the case of 
nonnegative covariance, such that maximum diversification choices entail (1,1) 0C = . 
 
2.1. Social Optimum 
In this setting, the question of interest concerns what the noncooperative choices of the two firms 
are, and how that compares with the desirable choices from society’s viewpoint. To address this in the 
simplest case, following Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) we assume that the payoff to society of at least one 
project being successful is  0B > , and we abstract from cost considerations. Thus, expected social 
welfare can be written as  [ ][ ] 1 ( , )E W B prob F F= ⋅ −  , where  [ ]E ⋅   is the expectation operator, so that 
the social planner’s problem is 
[ ]
1 2,
Max   [ ] 1 ( , )
a a
E W B prob F F= ⋅ −  .       (2) 
Therefore, the social planner maximizes the total probability of success. The objective function in 
equation (2) is strictly concave by Assumption 1, and thus we have a unique solution to the welfare 
maximization problem.  
Given our formulation, the solution to the problem in (2) is symmetric and it is labeled * *( , )a a . 
Note that, because  2( , ) 1 ( , ) ( )prob F F prob S F p a= − − =   11 ( , ) ( )prob F S p a− − , from equation (1) the 
optimality conditions for an interior solution are equivalent to  
[ ]1 1 22
1 1 1
( , ) ( ) ( , )1 ( ) 0prob S F p a C a ap a
a a a
∂ ∂ ∂
= − − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 ,     (3.a) 
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[ ]2 1 21
2 2 2
( , ) ( ) ( , )1 ( ) 0prob F S p a C a ap a
a a a
∂ ∂ ∂
= − − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 .     (3.b) 
That is, the social planner effectively maximizes the probabilities that each firm is the single winner. In 
doing this, it weighs the loss of the unconditional probability of success against the (optimal) 
diversification gain through the covariance term.  
 
2.2. Noncooperative Solution 
In contrast, in a competitive R&D setting, firms simultaneously choose research projects in a non-
cooperative fashion. Let  SSU    denote the expected payoff to each firm when both firms are successful, 
let  SU   denote the payoff to a single successful firm, and let  FU   be the payoff to the firm that fails 
(whether alone or jointly with the other firm). It is assumed that  2 0S SS FU U U≥ > = .4 Then, the firms’ 
optimization problems (conditional on the other firm choice) are  
1 1 2
1
Max   ( , ) ( , ) ( , )SS SV a a U prob S S U prob S F
a
≡ ⋅ + ⋅  ,     (4.1)  
2 1 2
2
Max   ( , ) ( , ) ( , )SS SV a a U prob S S U prob F S
a
≡ ⋅ + ⋅  ,     (4.2) 
with first-order conditions (FOCs) for an interior solution being 
1 1
( , ) ( , ) 0SS S
prob S S prob S FU U
a a
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂
 ,       (5.1) 
2 2
( , ) ( , ) 0SS S
prob S S prob F SU U
a a
∂ ∂
+ =
∂ ∂
 ,       (5.2) 
which yield the firms’ best-response functions. Note that, because by Assumption (1) ( , )prob F F  is 
convex in 1 2( , )a a  and ( )ip a  is concave, then ( , )prob F S  and ( , )prob S F  are concave in 1 2( , )a a . 
Furthermore, in view of (1), the firms’ objective functions can alternatively be written as 
                                               
4
  The condition 0SSU >  presumes that competition between successful innovators does not dissipate the 
rent created by the innovation, an outcome that is likely under a variety of market conditions (Cabral, 
1994). The condition 2S SSU U≥  simply means that a monopoly is at least as profitable as a duopoly. 
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( )1 1 2 1( , ) ( ) ( , )SS S SSV a a U p a U U prob S F= ⋅ + − ⋅  and ( )2 1 2 2( , ) ( ) ( , )SS S SSV a a U p a U U prob F S= ⋅ + − ⋅ , 
and therefore they are concave in the decision variables. Hence, the FOCs in (5) are both necessary and 
sufficient for a maximum. The (symmetric) competitive market portfolio—the Nash equilibrium, denoted 
by ( , )c ca a —satisfies the best-response functions of both firms, i.e., it solves equations (5). We shall 
further restrict our analysis as follows. 
 
Assumption 2. The problems in (2) and (4) admit solutions that lie in the interior of  [ ] [ ]0,1 0,1× .  
 
The following result (Proposition 3 in Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987) then follows. 
 
Proposition 1. The noncooperative solution consists of projects that are too highly correlated, relative to 
the social optimum. That is, *ca a< . 
 
Proof. By assumption 0SSU >  and, given Assumption 1, ( , ) 0iprob S S a∂ ∂ < ,  1,2i = . Hence, if 
equation (3) holds, equation (5) cannot hold. Specifically, the FOCs for the social optimum, when 
evaluated at the noncooperative equilibrium solution, are positive. Because the second-order conditions 
for the planner’s problem hold globally, the result of Proposition 1 follows.■ 
The intuition for this result is as follows. Whereas society does not care about the identity of the 
winner (i.e., society is indifferent between the outcomes ( , )S S , ( , )S F  and ( , )F S ), the firms of course 
do care. If, starting from the market equilibrium, a firm were to move away from the rival, toward the 
social optimum, it would create a positive externality for the opponent because it increases the probability 
that the opponent is successful when the firm in question is not. Although desirable for society because it 
increases the total probability of success, this effect is not taken into account in the firms’ problem.  
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2.3. Comparative Statics 
To extend the analysis of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) with the aim of considering multiple modes of 
protection, we first note that the competitive (Nash equilibrium) solution depends on the relative 
magnitude of the payoffs SSU  and SU . More specifically, the following preliminary result will be useful 
in what follows. 
 
Lemma 1. Let ( , )c ca a  denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative (interior) solution. 
Then  ca  is increasing in  SU   (the payoff to a single successful firm) and it is decreasing in  SSU   (the 
payoff when both firms are successful). Furthermore, if SS SR U U≡ , then ca  is decreasing in R .  
 
Proof. Let  1 2( , ; , ) 0i S SSa a U Uφ =  denote the FOC in equation (5) ( 1,2i = ), such that the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium is the solution to ( , ; , ) 0c ci S SSa a U Uφ = . From standard comparative statics one can then 
establish that ( ) ( )c S i Ssign a U sign Uφ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  and ( ) ( )c SS i SSsign a U sign Uφ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ . Furthermore,  
1 2,
( , ) 0c ci SS i a a a aU prob S S aφ = =∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ <  and 1 2,( , ) 0c ci S i a a a aU prob S F aφ = =∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ > . The first 
inequality follows directly from Assumption 1, and the second inequality follows from the fact that 
equation (5) holds. Similarly, ( ) ( )c isign a R sign Rφ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  and i Rφ∂ ∂ =  
1 2( , )
( , ) 0c ci a a a aprob S S a = =∂ ∂ < . ■ 
The important implication here is that anything that increases the payoffs in the event of a single 
successful firm without changing the payoff in the event of both firms succeeding will tend to decrease 
the correlation of the firms’ equilibrium choices. Similarly, decreasing the payoff when both firms 
succeed while keeping the payoffs in other events constant decreases the correlation of choices as well. 
This will be the basis for proving our main conclusion—that having different modes of IPR protection 
may lead to a more desirable outcome vis-à-vis the differentiation of firms’ research projects. 
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3. The Model with Patents and Trade Secrets 
To add an explicit consideration of alternative modes of protection, we continue to assume that 
research outcomes are common knowledge. The game tree is depicted in Figure 1. Note that this extends 
the one-shot game discussed earlier by the addition of an IP subgame. What were exogenous payoffs in 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) are made a function of IP choices along the lines of Denicolò and Franzoni 
(2004). Specifically, the winner of the research stage chooses between a patent and trade secret 
protection. The patent provides  T < ∞   periods of absolute monopoly. If we were to interpret the social 
payoff  B   as the present value of a perpetual flow of benefits, then  0 ,
rt b
r
B be dt∞ −= =∫   where  b   is the 
per-period benefit and  r   is the discount rate. Assuming, for simplicity, that the patentee can capture the 
entire social surplus while the patent is valid, a patent lasting  T  periods provides a return of  0
T rtbe dt−∫ . 
The reward from the patent protection can therefore be written as ( )T Bδ , where 
 ( ) (1 )rTT eδ −≡ −            (6) 
denotes the fraction of total social surplus captured by the patentee.5 We write  ( )Tδ   to emphasize that 
the reward offered by patents depends on a policy variable, the patent length T . 
The protection offered by trade secrets, rooted in civil law, can provide an alternative way to 
secure a temporary monopoly. Unlike the case of patents, the monopoly is of random duration and ends 
whenever other firms independently invent or reverse-engineer the invention, i.e., when the secret leaks 
out (Friedman, Landes, and Posner, 1991). Assuming an exponential distribution for the duration of the 
trade secret, the payoff in this case can be written as  ( )0
z r tbe dt∞ − +∫ , where the hazard rate  z   indexes the 
difficulty of concealing the invention (that is,  zte−  is the probability that the secret will not leak out by 
time t ). Thus, the reward from trade secret protection can be written as  ( )z Bγ  , where   
( ) rz
r z
γ ≡
+
             (7) 
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represents the fraction of total social surplus that can be captured under trade secrecy protection. We write  
( )zγ   to emphasize that the strength of protection offered by trade secrets depends on the hazard rate  
0z ≥  . Furthermore, the value of trade secrets as an IPR protection instrument depends on the provisions 
established by law (mostly state law in the United States). Thus, in this setting the parameter  z   also can 
be considered a policy instrument.6   
The loser of the R&D race gets zero payoff from its research activity. Furthermore, without loss 
of generality, in what follows we normalize the social benefit of success to 1B = . 
 
3.1. Equilibria in the IP Subgame 
To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game depicted in Figure 1, we begin with 
the subgames that start when R&D outcomes become known. Once the equilibrium payoffs from the IP 
subgames are determined, the game reduces to the one in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) discussed earlier. 
For three of the possible four outcomes the situation is trivial. For the event  ( , )F F , where both firms fail 
to innovate, the game ends with both firms obtaining a zero payoff. For the events ( , )S F  and ( , )F S , on 
the other hand, only one firm succeeds. The successful firm can obtain payoff ( )Tδ  with patenting and 
payoff ( )zγ  with trade secrecy, and thus the IP choice revolves around { }max ( ) , ( )z Tγ δ . The 
unsuccessful firm gets zero payoff.  
For event ( , )S S , when both firms are successful with the invention, we have a simultaneous-
move game for the firms’ choice of IP protection mode. We assume that if both firms try to patent, each 
has an equal chance of getting priority. If both choose trade secret protection, they will engage in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
5
 We assume that the social and private discount rates are identical, but this condition could easily be 
relaxed. 
6
 As in Denicolò and Franzoni (2004), the parameter r  could also account for the arrival rate of an 
alternative discovery that supersedes the technology. Under this interpretation, one may expect r  to be 
higher under the patent choice than under secrecy, because the information disclosure required by patents 
may be useful in the research for a superior innovation. Here we abstract from such generalizations. 
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duopoly competition as long as the secret does not leak out.7 If one of the firms decides to keep secret, it 
can of course be excluded whenever the other inventor decides to patent (the patenting firm would get the 
full reward). Finally, the parameter (0,1)μ ∈  captures the profit dissipation due to the competition that 
arises when both firms elect to use trade secrets (e.g., the joint profit of duopolists is lower than that of a 
monopolist).  
Note that if 2( ) ( )T z
μδ γ> , the profile (Patent, Patent) is the unique Nash equilibrium. In 
particular, if ( ) ( )z Tμγ δ≤  , this equilibrium is Pareto efficient. If  2 ( ) ( ) ( )z T z
μ γ δ μγ< <  , the IP game is 
of the prisoner’s dilemma type and the unique Nash equilibrium (Patent, Patent) yields a lower payoff (to 
both firms) than the profile (Secret, Secret). If  2( ) ( )T z
μδ γ≤ , on the other hand, we have a coordination 
game that admits two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, i.e., the profiles in which both firms patent and that in 
which both firms choose the trade secret. In this case, we also have a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Specifically, whenever  2( ) ( )T z
μδ γ< , the (symmetric) non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium is 
defined by  ( )* ( ) ( ) ( )T z Tσ δ μγ δ= ⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦   for both players, where  *σ   denotes the probability assigned to 
the pure-strategy “secret” (such that  *1 σ−   is the probability assigned to the pure-strategy “patent”).8 We 
can summarize the foregoing analysis in the following. 
 
Lemma 2. In the IP subgame that follows the event ( , )S S : (i) For  ( ) ( )T zδ μγ≥  there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium where both firms patent, and this equilibrium is Pareto efficient. (ii) For 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2z T zμγ δ μγ> >  there is a unique Nash equilibrium where both firms patent, and this equilibrium 
                                               
7
 We are implicitly assuming that the probability distribution of the trade secret duration does not depend 
on the number of secret holders. 
 
8
 The mixed-strategy solution is somewhat unappealing in our context because it implies that as the 
strategy profile in which both firms patent becomes less and less attractive, in equilibrium each firm puts 
more probability mass on the “patent” strategy. 
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is of the prisoner’s dilemma type. (iii) For ( ) 2 ( )z Tμγ δ≥  there are two pure-strategy equilibria—
(Patent, Patent) and (Secret, Secret)—and a mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes of the IP subgame. Note that, as μ  decreases 
towards 0 (i.e., the market competition between firms when both hold the trade secret dissipates profits 
more and more), the range of the parameter where (Patent, Patent) is the unique Nash equilibrium 
increases (in particular, the range for UNE-1 increases and that for UNE-2 decreases). Furthermore, the 
range of parameters where multiple equilibria arise also shrinks. 
 
3.2. Impact on Firms’ Research Paths 
By introducing alternative modes of protection, we have made otherwise exogenous payoffs a 
function of IP choices. Once the payoffs associated with the equilibria discussed in Lemma 2 are 
obtained, the reduced game has the same structure as the one in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987). We can 
then exploit the comparative statics analysis that we discussed in Lemma 1 to obtain comparisons of 
alternative IP environments. Specifically, we can conclude the following. 
 
Proposition 2. Whenever  (0,1)μ ∈   and  ( ) ( )T zδ γ< , the availability of trade secret protection, in 
addition to patents, leads firms to select actions that decrease the correlation of R&D outcomes, as 
compared with the patent-only environment, although the correlation level still remains higher than the 
socially optimal level. 
 
Proof. The equilibrium payoffs of the IP subgame, under the patents-plus-trade-secret environment, are 
summarized in the last two columns of Table 1. In contrast, recall that, in the patents-only environment, 
the expected payoff to the firms for the event ( ),S S  is 12 ( )PSSU Tδ=  and the payoff to the successful firm 
for events ( ),S F  and ( ),F S  is ( )PSU Tδ= . Hence, for the parameter range ( ) ( ) ( ) 2z T zγ δ μγ> > , the 
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availability of trade secret protection (in addition to patents) increases the winner’s payoff for the events 
with only one successful firm while it leaves unchanged the payoff for the event when both firms succeed. 
By Lemma 1, therefore, the equilibrium correlation level must decline (i.e., the Nash equilibrium action 
ca  increases. For the parameter range ( ) 2 ( )z Tμγ δ≥  the payoff associated with the event ( , )S S  
depends on which particular equilibrium one considers. For the (Patent, Patent) equilibrium the outcome 
is exactly as for the ( ) ( ) ( ) 2z T zγ δ μγ> >  parameter range. For the (Secret, Secret) equilibrium, the 
equilibrium payoffs under patent-plus-trade-secret environment is  2 ( )
P S
SSU z
μ γ+ =  for event  ( , )S S  and  
( )P SSU zγ+ =  for the events with a single successful firm. Then,  ( ) ( ) 12 2P S P S P PSS S SS SU U U Uμ+ + = < =  
because (0,1)μ ∈ , and hence the results of Lemma 1 apply to this domain as well. Finally, the mixed-
strategy equilibrium payoff under event ( , )S S  cannot exceed that of the equilibrium (Secret, Secret), and 
therefore we again conclude that ( ) ( )P S P S P PSS S SS SU U U U+ + < . By Lemma 1, therefore, the equilibrium 
correlation level must decline.■ 
 
The equilibrium R&D choices of the firms, for the various regions of the parameter space that we 
discussed, are illustrated in Figure 2. Note that whenever ( ) ( )T zδ γ< , (Patent, Patent) is a Nash 
equilibrium of the IP subgame. For this equilibrium the ratio P S P SSS SU U
+ +
 is monotonically increasing in 
( )Tδ , and so the equilibrium competitive action for this environment, labeled  cP Sa + , is decreasing (i.e., 
R&D projects are more and more correlated). For the subset ( )( ) 2 ( ) ( )z T zμγ δ γ< <  of this parameter 
range, the profile (Patent, Patent) is actually the unique Nash equilibrium, and the associated graph of  
c
P Sa +  is represented by the green segment in Figure 2. When ( ) ( )T zδ γ=  the payoff ratio reaches its 
maximum value of 12 ; this is the same as the patent-only environment, and thus 
c c
P S Pa a+ =  for 
( ) ( )T zδ γ≥ . For the domain ( ) ( ) 2T zδ μγ≤  we have two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. If the firms 
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could coordinate on the (Secret, Secret) equilibrium, the payoff ratio would be ( ) 12 2P S P SSS SU U μ+ + = < , 
leading to the equilibrium outcome that equals the value of the solution in a hypothetical trade-secret-only 
environment, labeled cSa   in Figure 2. Note that the trade-secret-only environment would lead to an 
equilibrium correlation level that is lower than the patent-only environment. In fact, it is even lower than 
the equilibrium correlation level under the patent-plus-secrecy environment whenever ( ) ( )T zδ μγ> . For 
the parameter range ( ) ( ) 2T zδ μγ≤  we also have a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium 
outcome of which is depicted by the red segment. 
We should stress that the main point of Proposition 2 does not rely on the assumption that 1μ < . 
Indeed, were one to make the (questionable) assumption that 1μ = , the parameter range 
( )( ) 2 ( ) ( )z T zγ δ γ< <  would still support our conclusion (see Figure 2). The parameter space associated 
with a unique equilibrium in the IP subgame could be extended by appealing to notions that select among 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Particularly attractive, in our case, is the notion of risk-dominant 
equilibrium (RDE) introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). In our  2 2×   symmetric game, if both 
players strictly prefer the same action when each assumes that the opponent randomizes evenly between 
the two available actions, then the profile in which they play that action is the RDE (Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1991).9 It follows that, if  3 2( ) ( ) ( )z T z
μ μγ δ γ< ≤ , then the profile (Patent, Patent) is the (unique) 
RDE, thereby extending the parameter range whereby the competitively chosen diversification efforts are 
decreasing in ( )zγ (i.e., the green segment in Figure 2). Conversely, if 3( ) ( )T z
μδ γ< , the RDE profile is 
(Secret, Secret) and, for the case 3( ) ( )T z
μδ γ= , neither pure-strategy equilibrium is dominating (which 
makes the mixed-strategy equilibrium perhaps more meaningful at this point).  
                                               
9
 The basic idea is that, when a player does not know which equilibrium is selected by the other player, 
she will play the strategy of the less risky equilibrium. Risk-dominance as an equilibrium selection 
criterion in  2 2×   games also is supported by the global games analysis of Carlsson and van Damme 
(1993), the results of which are extended to supermodular games by Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003). 
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An additional result that is worth emphasizing in this model concerns the ability of the social 
planner to affect firms’ choices by altering the parameters T  and z  that index the strength of IPR 
protection.  
 
Proposition 3. In the patent-only environment the social planner cannot affect the firms’ R&D 
diversification choices by choosing the patent length T . In the patent-plus-trade-secret environment, on 
the other hand, the social planner may be able to induce firms to diversify toward the social optimum by 
providing a relatively weaker protection to patents (or stronger protection to trade secrets).  
 
Proof. The first part of the proposition follows directly from observing that, in the patent-only 
environment, the payoff ratio ( ) 12P PSS SU U =  is independent of patent length T . In the patent-plus-
secrecy environment, on the other hand, cP Sa +  monotonically increases as T decreases for the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the parameter range ( ) ( ) ( ) 2z T zγ δ μγ> > .■ 
 
 For a similar argument, the social planner cannot affect R&D correlation in the other polar case, 
the trade-secret-only environment, by choosing the strength of trade secret protection (as indexed by the 
leak parameter z ). Hence, in our setting, the strength of IPR protection can be an effective policy 
instrument, to affect the firms’ equilibrium R&D correlation level, only if multiple protection instruments 
are available. Thus, our analysis provides another justification for the optimality of a finite patent length, 
distinct from the classic trade-off between dynamic incentive benefits and static efficiency losses 
analyzed by Nordhaus (1969) and others.  
 
4. An Example 
The relationship between the equilibrium correlation levels, the different values of the leak 
parameter, and the behavior of the correlation level under different solution concepts as patent length 
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varies can be illustrated with the following example. First, we parameterize the correlation coefficient as  
1
1 221 ( )a aρ ≡ − + . Thus, as in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), we consider the case of non-negative 
correlation only. Next, the unconditional probability functions are specified as  21 14 8( )i i ip a a= − . Note 
that this implies 12( ) [0, ]i ip a ∈  and, given our parameterization of correlation, the condition  
1
2( ) [0, ]i ip a ∈   is sufficient to ensure that the covariance term is decreasing in the actions  1a   and  2a . 
Thus, this parameterization satisfies the basic assumptions of our model. The resulting social planner’s 
objective function, equation (2), is in fact concave for the domain of interest. To solve for the firms’ 
noncooperative choices, we set  0.04r =  and, consistent with the assumed normalization 1B = , set 
b r= . Finally, we set 8 9μ =  (as would result, for example, from a textbook example of Cournot 
competition with linear demands). 
Having computed the optimal R&D choices, in Figure 3 we report the implied correlation 
coefficient ρ  under various conditions regarding ( )zγ  and ( )Tδ . Specifically, here we fix the patent 
length as  20T =   years (as is the case in virtually all jurisdictions), so that the fraction of social surplus 
that is offered by patent protection is (20) 0.55δ = , and then consider various levels of the trade secret 
parameter ( )zγ . The socially optimal correlation level for this example turns out to be 0.48ρ∗ = . If IPR 
protection were available only through patents, the firms’ noncooperative action choices would result in 
0.76Pρ = . When trade secrets are available, in addition to patents, then we need to differentiate 
according to the parameter space. For values of  z   such that  ( ) (20)zγ δ≤ , trade secret protection is not 
effective and the correlation level is calculated as 0.76P S Pρ ρ+ = = . When  ( )zγ  exceeds (20),δ trade 
secret protection becomes relevant and the Nash equilibrium correlation level decreases, reaching a 
minimum of 0.63  (when  ( ) 1zγ =  ). For the range (20) ( ) 1zδ γ< ≤  , the profile in which both firms 
patent is actually the unique Nash equilibrium. In fact, given the chosen levels of the parameters, here it is 
always the case that  2 ( ) (20)z
μ γ δ< , [0, )z∀ ∈ ∞  and (0,1)μ∀ ∈ , and thus the case of multiple equilibria 
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for the IP subgame does not arise. This equilibrium is of the prisoner’s dilemma type for ( ) (20) /zγ δ μ> , 
that is, for ( ) 0.62zγ > . Thus, the profit-dissipation parameter (0,1)μ ∈ does not affect P Sρ + in Figure 3 
but affects only the hypothetical correlation level that would attain in the trade-secret-only environment, 
say, Sρ  and, from the foregoing, 0.73S Pρ ρ= < .  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown that the availability of multiple modes of protection—specifically trade secrets 
and patents—can affect the equilibrium outcome of competitively chosen diversification efforts in a 
parallel research contest. In particular, the availability of trade secrets in addition to patents can push the 
market outcome toward the social optimum as far as the choice of correlation among R&D projects is 
concerned. Therefore, considering a generic winner-takes-all contest (with an implicit single mode of 
protection) in studying the correlation level of firms’ R&D activities may miss an important institutional 
feature and may overestimate the bias inherent in competitive parallel research contests.  
Another implication of the model that we have studied is that it is only when multiple modes of 
protection are present that the competitively chosen R&D diversification efforts can be affected by the 
patent length. In reality, of course, patent length is fixed by law and, following the implementation of the 
TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organization, it is the same (20 years) for all signatory countries. 
But what matters here is the strength of IPR protection offered by patents relative to that of trade secrets, 
and the latter are quite a bit more variable because they are rooted in civil law. Furthermore, the strength 
of trade secret protection may vary across technology fields because it depends crucially on the feasibility 
of reverse engineering (admissible under trade secret protection). Hence, in some fields at least, the 
availability of trade secret protection may be critical for the nature of competitively chosen R&D 
activities and may beneficially affect firms’ R&D diversification efforts.  
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Table 1.  Parametric Domain, Equilibrium IP Strategies, and Outcomes with Both Patents and 
Trade Secrets 
 
Parametric domain Event ( ),S S : both firms are successful Events ( ),S F  
or ( ),F S  
 
Equilibrium 
profile(s) 
Type of 
equilibrium 
Equilibrium 
payoff(s) 
Winner’s 
payoff 
( ) ( )T zδ γ≥  (Patent , Patent) UNE-1 1 ( )
2
Tδ  ( )Tδ  
( ) ( ) ( )z T zγ δ μγ> ≥  (Patent , Patent) UNE-1 1 ( )
2
Tδ  ( )zγ  
( ) ( ) ( ) 2z T zμγ δ μγ> >  (Patent , Patent) UNE-2 1 ( )
2
Tδ  ( )zγ  
( ) 2 ( )z Tμγ δ≥  
(Patent , Patent) 
 
(Secret , Secret) 
 
( )*,1 *σ σ−  
MNE 
( )
1 ( )
2
( )
2
( ) ( )
2 ( ) ( )
T
z
z T
z T
δ
μ γ
μγ δ
μγ δ−
 ( )zγ  
 
Notes: UNE-1 = Unique Nash equilibrium (Pareto efficient);  
UNE-2 = Unique Nash equilibrium (prisoner’s dilemma);  
MNE = Multiple Nash equilibria, where the mixed-strategy equilibrium is ( )* ( ) ( )
T
z T
δ
σ
μγ δ= − .  
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Figure 1.The Model with Patents and Trade Secrets 
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Figure 2. Correlation of R&D Projects and Solution Concepts  
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Figure 3. R&D Correlation with Patents and Trade Secrets 
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* 0.48ρ =
0.76Pρ =
(20)δ
( )zγ
P Sρ +
0.73Sρ =
1
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